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Managing Policy: Executive Agencies of the 
European Commission 
AďstƌaĐt: ͚AgeŶĐifiĐatioŶ͛ iŶ the EuƌopeaŶ UŶioŶ has eŵeƌged as aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌeseaƌĐh 
topic at the intersection between political science and organizational studies. This 
Working Paper focuses on a group of six agencies under the wings of the European 
Commission that is often overlooked in the literature, despite the fact that these 
agencies are now set up for more than a decade, and despite the fact that their 
portfolio is growing. It sheds light on the historical context of their establishment and 
their legal foundation, looks at their organizational structure, and investigates the 
fields of action in which they are tasked to operate. 
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1 Introductioni 
IŶ his seŵiŶal aƌtiĐle, ‘eŶaud Dehousse has desĐƌiďed ͚the ĐƌeatioŶ of EuƌopeaŶ 
ageŶĐies͛ ͚as a ƌespoŶse to […] fuŶĐtioŶal Ŷeeds͛ (1997, 255; similarly, Kreher 1997). 
“iŶĐe theŶ, ŵoƌe aŶd ŵoƌe EuƌopeaŶ ageŶĐies haǀe ďeeŶ Đƌeated, aŶd ͚ageŶĐifiĐatioŶ͛ 
has become a significant field of research in European integration. Several special 
issues in first-class journals, as well as collective volumes and monographs, have 
substantiated our knowledge about agencies, and also added political and institutional 
ƌeasoŶs to Dehousse͛s fuŶĐtioŶal aƌguŵeŶt (Groenleer 2009, 111; Rittberger and 
Wonka 2011, 782). The subject of those studies has been the group of (by now more 
than ϯϬͿ EuƌopeaŶ ageŶĐies ǁith ͚;seŵi-)regulatory, monitoring, and coordination 
tasks͛ (Groenleer 2009, 15) that ͚haǀe theiƌ oǁŶ legal peƌsoŶalitǇ and a certain financial 
autoŶoŵǇ͛ (Pollak and Riekmann 2008, 777). 
In the lingo of European iŶstitutioŶs, these ďodies aƌe ŶoǁadaǇs Đalled ͚deĐeŶtƌalized 
ageŶĐies͛ (cf. European Parliament, Council of the European Union, and European 
Commission 2013, C 373/1:6). This attribution seems more appropriate than that of 
͚ƌegulatoƌǇ ageŶĐies͛, ǁhiĐh has ďeeŶ a faǀoƌite aŵoŶg sĐholaƌs foƌ a ǁhile, likelǇ 
because their research interest has been stimulated by studies on equivalent 
administrative bodies at national level (such as Gilardi 2008). The problem with the 
attƌiďutioŶ of ͚ƌegulatoƌǇ͛ is that ŵaŶǇ of the ageŶĐies at EuƌopeaŶ leǀel fulfil otheƌ 
(minor, in the sense of less autonomous) tasks than regulating (Vos 2003; Busuioc 
2013, 38–42). The ŶotioŶ ͚deĐeŶtƌalized͛, oŶ the haŶd, iŶdiĐates Ŷot oŶlǇ a 
geographical component (most of those agencies are located in places different than 
Brussels and Luxembourg), but also a functional one, subsuming more generally that 
certain governmental tasks are delegated to the decentralized bodies.ii 
Decentralized agencies are a stimulating research object, for at least three reasons. 
First, they have distinctively different roles than national independent regulatory 
agencies (Thatcher 2011). “eĐoŶd, theiƌ ͚ǁide ǀaƌieties of […] foƌŵats͛ ĐaŶ ďe ƌegaƌded 
as eǆĐitiŶg eǆaŵples of the ͚tƌial-and-eƌƌoƌ pƌoĐess […] ǁell kŶoǁŶ fƌoŵ state-building 
histoƌǇ͛ (Pollak and Riekmann 2008, 777; similarly, Egeberg and Trondal 2011). Third, 
the unclear degree of their autonomy or independence in a polity with multiple 
delegation chains (Curtin 2005) ƌaises ƋuestioŶs suĐh as ǁhetheƌ theǇ ĐaŶ ͚ƌeallǇ take 
autoŶoŵous aĐtioŶ͛ (Groenleer 2009, 17; similarly Makhashvili and Stephenson 2013), 
and to what extent they are accountable to democratically elected institutions (Busuioc 
2012, 2013). 
The European nomenclature also foresees a second type of administrative bodies, for 
ǁhiĐh the ŶotioŶ ͚eǆeĐutiǀe ageŶĐies͛ is used. Formally at least, they, too, are legal 
personalities, delegated with a (more or less) clear list of tasks, and outfitted with 
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resources from the European budget to fulfil them. Yet as Madalina Busuioc has once 
aptlǇ desĐƌiďed theŵ, theǇ aƌe ͚aŶ altogetheƌ diffeƌeŶt ďƌeed of ďodies͛; what 
separates them from their decentralized siblings is that theǇ ͚fall under the 
ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ of the CoŵŵissioŶ͛ (Busuioc 2013, 24). Due to this intimate relationship 
with the European Commission, agencification scholars seem to have assumed so far 
that executive agencies at European level are not a particularly interesting object for 
research, as there is no academic paper on them so far.iii 
This Working Paper takes on the quest of answering whether that assumption is true. 
In doing so, it takes a closer look at executive agencies at European level, lifting them 
out of obscurity through a set of questions equivalent to those that agencification 
scholars have been asking for a while now: where do they come from and what are the 
policy fields in which they are tasked to operate? What is their specific functionality 
within the ever growing European administrative landscape, and what role do they play 
iŶ ͚the iŶteƌŶal politiĐs ǁithiŶ the EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ͛ (Bauer 2008, 641)? In the 
following three sections, the most important and peculiar features of executive 
ageŶĐies aƌe highlighted. The seĐtioŶs͛ topiĐs folloǁ loosely the distinction by 
Rittberger and Wonka (2011). 
The next (second) section focuses on the historical context of their emergence and 
functionalities for the Commission. The third section investigates the size and growth 
of executive agencies since establishment, the fields of action to which they have been 
assigned, and the type of work that they are actually doing. Section four addresses the 
organizational setup of the agencies, namely how they are organized, what their 
relationship is to the parental organization; it also elaborates on indications for de 
facto differences between the individual agencies. The Working Paper ends with a 
more comprehensive comparison of differences between executive agencies and 
decentralized agencies at European level, and summarizes the findings and open 
questions. 
This Working Paper takes up conceptual findings from the growing literature on 
EuƌopeaŶ ͚ageŶĐifiĐatioŶ͛, ǁhiĐh has eŵeƌged as a ǀiǀid ƌeseaƌĐh field oŶ its oǁŶ at the 
intersection of political science and organizational studies. Methodologically, the 
papeƌ͛s aŶalǇsis is ŵostlǇ ďased oŶ puďliĐlǇ aĐĐessiďle doĐuŵeŶts (legal texts, 
communications, reports, etc.) from the respective agencies and from the European 
institutions. Specifically, in section 2 and 3, documents concerning the EU budget and 
the last two editions of the EU Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) have been 
used.iv This material provides a great wealth of formal information about the executive 
agencies; however, since the data is drawn from documents that have been written for 
various different (namely, political, fiscal, and bureaucratic) purposes and certainly not 
for an academic assessment, and since there has been no complementary in-depth 
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analysis of the agencies based on interviews or ethnography, there are also important 
liŵitatioŶs as to ǁhat ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶĐluded fƌoŵ this data. That͛s ǁhǇ eaĐh of the three 
main sections will necessarily leave questions open, questions that will be directly 
addressed in the final section for further research. 
2 Brief historical outline of executive 
agencies 
Since the 1990s, the transnational polity nowadays known as European Union was in a 
constant mode of enlargement. With that is not only meant to describe a spatial 
dynamic, but also the fact that more and more policy tasks were delegated to the 
European level ďǇ the politǇ͛s ŵeŵďeƌ states. Yet for the European Commission, the 
main executive institution of this polity, the extension of its programs caŵe as a ͚ŵiǆed 
ďlessiŶg͛: iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ, ͚it does Ŷot just haǀe to paǇ to plaŶ aŶd deǀise poliĐǇ, ďut also 
to iŵpleŵeŶt aŶd ŵaŶage it.͛ (Bauer 2002, 4). The CoŵŵissioŶ͛s aŶsǁeƌ to that 
dilemma generally was outsourcing of services to a vast number of so-called ͚technical 
assistance offices͛. 
EaƌlǇ iŶ the ϮϬϬϬs, iŶ the afteƌŵath of the ƌesigŶatioŶ of the PƌesideŶt “aŶdeƌ͛s College 
and amidst grave accusations of nepotism and fraud, the Commission was forced to 
make changes to its traditional mode of operations (European Commission 2000a; 
Kinnock 2004; Kassim 2008). AŵoŶg otheƌ issues, aŶd as paƌt of ͚aŶ eǆpliĐit poliĐǇ oŶ 
eǆteƌŶalisatioŶ͛, the tƌaditioŶal pƌaĐtiĐe of delegatiŶg seƌǀiĐes to private firms had to 
be terminated and replaced by what was initially Đalled ͚a Ŷeǁ tǇpe of iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg 
ďodǇ͛ (European Commission 2000a, Sec III.2, see also 2000b, 18–22). v  Council 
Regulation 58/2003 established the right of the Commission to set up executive 
ageŶĐies, iŶ oƌdeƌ ͚to delegate soŵe of the tasks ƌelated to the ŵaŶageŵeŶt of 
CoŵŵuŶitǇ pƌogƌaŵŵes to thiƌd paƌties.͛ (Council of the European Union 2002, L 
57/1:1). 
As it provided a solution to an imminent problem of the Commission, the new 
executive agency template was quickly and pragmatically taken advantage of. The first 
executive agency was set up in early 2004, and until late 2007, a total of six such 
agencies were established. It͛s ŶoteǁoƌthǇ that the CoŵŵissioŶ, still ďeiŶg uŶdeƌ 
considerable organizational distress at that time (Peterson 2008), was rather 
pragmatic. The legal text required the Commission to subject any aim for outsourcing 
to ͚a Đost-benefit analysis which includes the costs of coordination and checks, the 
impact on human resources, efficiency and flexibility in the implementation of 
outsourced tasks, simplification of the procedures used, proximity of outsourced 
activities to final beneficiaries, visibility of the Community as promoter of the 
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Community programme concerned and the need to maintain an adequate level of 
know-hoǁ iŶside the CoŵŵissioŶ.͛ (Council of the European Union 2002, L 57/1:1). Yet 
an early assessment of executive agencies found that, ͚despite the iŶteŶtioŶs …, staff 
shortages (in number and specialisation) at the Commission were the main driver for 
exteƌŶalisatioŶ͛ (European Court of Auditors 2009, 14). 
Did the new type of administrative body live up to expectations? The historical records 
are ambiguous. Since 2007, no new agency has been established, and from the existing 
ones, three have been renamed (see figure 1). Still, available numbers indicate that 
those six agencies were, overall, deemed successful by their parental organization. 
After all, their staff has been growing from 33 in 2004 to 1,609 in 2012 and to 2055 in 
2016. Similarly, the annual operative budget (i.e., the budget that the agencies have to 
ĐaƌƌǇ out theiƌ ǀaƌious tasksͿ has Đliŵďed fƌoŵ € ϱ.ϯ Bio of Đoŵŵitted appƌopƌiatioŶs 
in 2012 (or 3,42 per cent of the total European Commission budget of that year) to 
alŵost € ϭϬ.ϱ Bio iŶ ϮϬϭϲ ;oƌ ϲ,ϳϳ peƌ ĐeŶtͿ. To explain this peculiar development, it is 
necessary to look closer at the specific legal requirements of founding executive 
agencies, and to reflect on the general political context since 2007. 
Figure 1: Lifeline of executive agencies 
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 EACEA (Education, Audiovisual and Culture EA) 
IEEA (Intelligent Energy 
EA) 
EACI (EA for Competitiveness and 
Innovation) 
EASME (EA for 
Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises) 
 
PHEA (Public 
Health EA) 
EAHC (EA for Health and Consumers 
CHAFEA 
(Consumers, Health 
and Food EA) 
 ERCEA (European Research Council EA) 
 REA (Research Executive Agency) 
 TEN-T EA (Trans-European Transport Network EA) 
INEA (Innovation & 
Networks EA) 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, based on http://europa.eu/about-eu/agencies/index_en.htm (2017-08-08), and a 
Commission dossier on the matter (Commission En Direct 2016, 32–45). 
To ďetteƌ uŶdeƌstaŶd the eǆistiŶg eǆeĐutiǀe ageŶĐies͛ fuŶĐtioŶ foƌ the CoŵŵissioŶ aŶd 
the increase of their staff as ǁell as of the assigŶed tasks, it͛s iŵpoƌtaŶt to eŵphasize 
the link to the routinely negotiated EU budget. Setting the EU budget between the 
main EU institutions had always been intertwined with political struggles (Laffan 2000). 
TƌaditioŶallǇ, this ĐoŶĐeƌŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs aŶd ƌetuƌŶs foƌ eaĐh of the ŵeŵďeƌ states͛ 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶts, as foƌ theŵ, ͚the Ŷet ďalaŶĐe ƌeŵaiŶs the deĐisiǀe poiŶt foƌ assessiŶg the 
outĐoŵe͛ (Becker 2012, 10). The budget negotiations in the mid-2000s, preparing the 
financial framework for the period of 2007-13, exposed a new weakness: politicians of 
different origins readily used the occasion to boost their (domestic) profile by publicly 
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deŶouŶĐiŶg the ǁaste of taǆpaǇeƌs͛ ŵoŶeǇ at EuƌopeaŶ leǀel. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, the ďudget 
heading dealing with administrative costs (providing, among other things, the salaries 
of Commission staff) was under attack. 
The European Commission faced the prospect was of a financial framework that was 
increasing in volume and, more problematic, in numbers of programs to be carried out, 
while administrative costs would be frozen. Since the financial framework determined 
the ceiling of EU spending, but not the actual annual budget, the Commission had to 
find a way to cut administrative costs beyond the salary cuts already implemented in 
the wake of the Kinnock reforms (Gray 2004). In this situation, it must have been more 
thaŶ ĐoŶǀeŶieŶt that the adŵiŶistƌatiǀe ďudget of eǆeĐutiǀe ageŶĐies ǁas ͚dƌaǁŶ fƌoŵ 
the financial envelope of the programmes uŶdeƌ theiƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt.͛ IŶ otheƌ ǁoƌds, 
͚the ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg appƌopƌiatioŶs aƌe … outside the ĐeiliŶg oŶ ƌesouƌĐes͛ that 
determine the overall Commission budget (European Court of Auditors 2009, 11). 
A similar development was going on when negotiations started for the next budget 
cycle. This time, in its proposal for the financial framework for the period 2014-20, the 
Commission not only took pre-emptive measures by producing evidence of its own 
fƌugalitǇ, ďut also iŶĐluded a seƌies of ŵeasuƌes of ͚siŵplifiĐatioŶ͛, ĐoŶsistiŶg of tǁo 
types of reform: re-packaging the programs run by the Commission (for example, 
putting several independent programs uŶdeƌ the ͚HoƌizoŶ ϮϬϮϬ͛ fƌaŵeǁoƌkͿ, aŶd 
reducing administrative costs – basically saying that it would continue outsourcing the 
conduct of its programs to executive agencies more aggressively (European 
Commission 2011a, C 264/18:21–23). This could not avoid political debate about the 
CoŵŵissioŶ ǁastiŶg taǆpaǇeƌs͛ ŵoŶeǇ agaiŶ;vi and also, it did not prevent Council and 
PaƌliaŵeŶt to iŶsist oŶ Đuts iŶ the adŵiŶistƌatiǀe ďudget to ďe applied ͚to all 
iŶstitutioŶs, ďodies aŶd ageŶĐies͛ (European Parliament, Council of the European 
Union, and European Commission 2013, C 373/1:5). Yet it elevated once more the role 
of executive agencies. The current financial framework, for the first time, downsized its 
overall budget ceiling (Council of the European Union 2013). The only budget that 
continued to grow is under heading 1a – ͚CoŵpetitiǀeŶess foƌ gƌoǁth aŶd joďs͛ 
(European Commission 2013a, 17). 
If this helps to understand why the existing executive agencies play an ever more 
important role in the administrative logic of the European Commission, it leaves the 
question open why no new executive agency has been founded since 2007, and why 
the name of three agencies has changed. For this, the initial Regulation 58 has to be 
consulted. Two aspects are crucial here: one is that the Regulation prescribes that 
setting up a new executive agency from scratch requires the consent of the member 
states (Council of the European Union 2002, L 57/1:7 (art.24)). Obviously, this 
requirement involves considerable political-administrative costs, and, as the historical 
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analysis of one case has shown, not only in negotiations between Commission and 
Council, but even within the executive branch (König 2017, 87). Since 2007, then, is 
seems as if those costs have been deemed too high, even though the overall mandate 
of executive agencies has been quite substantially enlarged. 
This is particularly true given the second provision in the legal text that helps to explain 
why names are changing (and, as that͛s ǁhat a Ŷeǁ Ŷaŵe usuallǇ sigŶals how the 
mandate is changed): by definition, the lifespan of an executive agency is limited, but it 
can be extended (Council of the European Union 2002, L 57/1:art.3(1,3)). Obviously, 
this makes executive agencies very flexible: whenever there are new programs 
delegated to the European Commission that are labor-intensive (and, usually, also less 
related to policy-shaping), the existing agencies can rather easily be reprogrammed. 
This avoids the costs of setting up new agencies, and it has the additional benefit that 
expertise built up by the respective agency staff is maintained, too. Since updating the 
list of tasks is connected to the seven-year cycle of the EU multi-annual financial 
framework, the ƌeŶeǁal of ageŶĐies is also liŶked to this politiĐal pƌoĐess. That͛s ǁhǇ 
two agencies changed their name in the aftermath of adopting the financial framework 
2007-13, as did three of the six during the implementation of the successive 
framework, 2014-20.  
With this analysis, a picture emerges of executive agencies as convenient 
administrative vessels for outsourcing tasks. They are convenient because they remain 
flexible (due to their limited lifespan) to the changing demands of their parental 
organization, and because they build up a (somewhat separated) workforce that is, in 
total, cheaper than Commission personnel, and that is not to be calculated into the 
administrative costs of the Commission. Finally, they are also convenient because they 
all rely on the same legal provision, which implies that, at least in theory, steering and 
oversight is following the same template for all six of them. 
3 What executive agencies are tasked to do 
Council Regulation 58 alloǁs the CoŵŵissioŶ to ͚eŶtƌust ĐeƌtaiŶ tasks iŶ the 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt of CoŵŵuŶitǇ pƌogƌaŵŵes͛ to eǆeĐutiǀe ageŶĐies (Council of the 
European Union 2002, L 57/1:2). But what exactly are those tasks? This section 
attempts to compare systematically some indicators that allow to draw some 
conclusions to answer this question. First, it looks at size and growth of executive 
agencies since their establishment, before it analyses the fields of action to which they 
have been assigned. Finally, it also assesses the type of work that they are actually 
doing. 
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To start with, how did the individual agencies develop in the last five years? Figure 2 
shows that, while the overall staff levels as well as the overall operative budget has 
been increased for all six agencies, there are substantial differences for each of them. 
Specifically, the operative budget of agencies differs widely, and so does the increase 
between 2012 and 2016. Also, staffing levels have developed very differently, with 
EASME more than doubling, and REA, INEA, and ERCEA at least significantly increasing 
their staff, while CHAFEA and EACEA were even downsizing somewhat. 
Figure 2: Operative budget of agency and staff 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv. Note: left axis refers to operative budget in Mio 
€; right aǆis refers to Ŷuŵďer of eŵploǇees – the blue arrow indicates increase of staff level in 2016 against 2012. 
Another important finding from this comparison is that, overall, the relation between 
operative budget per employee has been increased since 2012, implying that less 
workforce is needed to handle a greater operative budget. This may be read by officials 
as an increase in efficiency. However, it is also notable that, for each agency, the 
overall operative budget relates very differently to the number of staff, as can be seen 
in table 1. While, at CHAFEA, foƌ eaĐh eŵploǇee theƌe ǁeƌe appƌoǆiŵatelǇ € Ϯ Mio iŶ 
ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt appƌopƌiatioŶs aǀailaďle, at INEA it is a ǁhoppiŶg € Ϯϳ.ϰ Mio. That 
indicates that not only are the agencies very differently endowed for their various 
tasks, they are probably also expected to fulfil different types of work, and in different 
areas. 
In what policy areas are the six executive agencies active? While this question is 
generally difficult to answer, not least due to the ambiguous nature of policy areas, 
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there are some indications to be found in the depths of individual agency reports as 
well as the Commission budget. The European Commission (as the executive branch of 
the European Union) envelopes its vast array of activities in budget numbers along two 
basic sets of structures. On the one hand, the budget, which allocates certain amounts 
of money to titles; each title again is broken down into chapters.vii  On the other hand, 
in negotiating the multi-annual financial framework, it has become common to operate 
with so-called MFF headings, probably to represent publicly the overall envelopes of all 
EU actions. Again, each of those headings consists of several programs.viii 
Table 1: operative budget per employee 
 
Mio € per employee 
2012 2016 
CHAFEA 1.47 € 2.04 € 
EACEA 1.53 € 1.65 € 
EASME 1.64 € 2.98 € 
ERCEA 4.37 € 4.36 € 
INEA ϭϯ.ϯϬ € 27.46 € 
REA Ϯ.ϳϭ € 2.74 € 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv. 
Intricately (but not surprisingly), the relation between budget titles and MFF headings, 
as well as between budget chapters and programs is not necessarily straightforward:ix 
the fuŶdiŶg foƌ the ƌeseaƌĐh pƌogƌaŵ ͞HoƌizoŶ ϮϬϮϬ͟, foƌ eǆaŵple, is distƌiďuted aloŶg 
several budget titles.x The executive agencies are tasked to take care of (parts) of 
certain programs; yet the (four-digit) budget chapters equip the specific programs 
(partly) with the necessary funding. Hence, it is possible to compare, for two distinct 
years, the budget chapters that are mentioned in the executive agency reports with 
the actual annual budget (for the full list of partly delegated chapters, see Annexes 1 
and 2) and to draw some conclusions from this set of data. 
As can be seen in table 2, the annual operative budget of the executive agencies has 
been considerably increased between 2012 and 2016 and so has, overall, the number 
of delegated chapters, which indicates that the range of programs outsourced to these 
bodies is growing. Table 2 also reveals that there are some important differences 
between the agencies. Three have actually reduced the number of chapters (partly) 
delegated to them (CHAFEA, EACEA, ERCEA), while the others have doubled (REA), 
tripled (EASME), and sextupled (INEA) the number of chapters partly delegated to 
them. Yet while the budget of EASME and INEA has been raised as was somewhat to be 
expected, the budget of REA has only seen some incremental increase, albeit the 
number of employees has climbed up quite substantially. This may indicate that the 
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programs that this agency is tasked to fulfil have not been expanded, but only been 
organized differently in the budgetary procedure; and it may also indicate that this 
agency has taken up additional administrative tasks as well that do not correspond 
with an increase of operative budget, similar to what seems to be the case with 
CHAFEA and, maybe, EACEA. 
Table 2: Annual commitment appropriations of executive 
agencies 
 2012 2016 
EA Delegated 
chapters 
Operative budget 
;Mio €Ϳ 
Delegated 
chapters 
Operative budget 
;Mio €Ϳ 
CHAFEA 5 73,33 4 100,10 
EACEA 10 653,35 9 692,47 
EASME 3 255,83 9 1.110,25 
ERCEA 2 1.660,12 1 1.788,16 
INEA 1 1.317,564 6 5.107,881 
REA 4 1.346,11 8 1.690,63 
Total 25 5.306,304 37 10.489,491 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv. 
Although the annual EU budget and the financial framework follow a different 
architecture, the budget chapters are linked to the MFF headings. Hence it is possible 
to look at which chapters (partly) delegated to the executive agencies are assigned to 
which MFF heading. Table 2 reveals that, broadly, the activities of executive agencies 
fall into four of the main headings, namely Competitiveness (1.a), Natural resources 
(2), Security and Citizens (3), and Global Europe (4). Already in 2012, while the number 
of chapters partly delegated to the executive agencies were somewhat evenly 
distributed, it is obvious that, in terms of operational allocated budget, 
͚CoŵpetitiǀeŶess͛ ǁas the ŵost prominent heading. In 2016, this trend has become 
only reinforced. Two thirds of all delegated chapters fall into this heading now, with a 
budget of more than ten billion Euro. Not only in total numbers, the executive agencies 
have a much more prominence in carrying out the programs under this heading, with 
more than 50 per cent of the overall budget of this heading assigned to them. Merely 
.05 per cent of heading 2, slightly more than 6 per cent of heading 3, and not quite four 
per cent of heading 4 are delegated to the executive agencies. 
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Table 3: Assignment of delegated chapters to MFF Headings 
 2012 2016 
MFF Delegated 
chapters 
Budget (Mio 
€Ϳ 
% of 
total 
Delegated 
chapters 
Budget  
;Mio €Ϳ 
% of 
total 
1.a: Competitiveness 11 ϰ.ϴϮϳ,ϰϲ € 32,72 25 ϭϬ.ϬϮϬ,ϰϬ € 52,71 
2: Natural resources 1 ϭϰ,ϭϮ € 0,02 1 ϭϴ,ϰϴ € 0,05 
3: Security and 
Citizenship 
5 Ϯϴϰ,ϭϮ € 13,76 6 Ϯϲϵ,ϯϯ € 6,65 
4: Global Europe 8 ϭϴϬ,ϲϬ € 1,92 5 ϭϴϭ,Ϯϴ € 3,95 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv.xi 
Accordingly, as figure 3 shows, only two agencies - CHAFEA and EACEA - have been 
linked to budget chapters assigned to more than two MFF headings; of the remaining 
four, three agencies are tasked to carry out programs that fall only into the MFF 
heading 1a of competitiveness. This trend has been enforced until 2016: now EASME, 
which was handling partly programs in the field of heading 2, is to be located solely in 
chapters that relate to heading 1a, too. Thus, five of the six executive agencies firmly 
belong under the MFF heading called competitiveness. Not incidentally, and as 
mentioned in the previous chapter, competitiveness has seen quite an increase over 
the past two decades. Alas, executive agencies are assigned tasks in fields where the 
Commission has gained responsibilities over the past decades. It is also where the 
European Commission is tasked to distribute public funds directly, unlike the two areas 
that, traditionally, constitute the largest share of the EU budget, namely agriculture 
(heading 2) and regional policy (heading 1b), and where the Commission merely 
supervises the rules of distribution (the funding is actually distributed by the member 
states). 
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Figure 3: Number of budget chapters (partly) delegated 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv. Note: dark bar represents 2012, light bar 
represents 2016. The chapters are distinguished along their (main) assignment to MFF headings in the budget table. 
What type of work are the executive agencies actually doing? An (admittedly rough) 
analysis of the self-description of the six executive agencies (based on the articles in 
Commission En Direct 2016, 40–45) provides some answers and helps to understand as 
to why the agencies differ so widely in staff, assignment, and operative budget. As can 
be seen from table 4, one of the six agencies, CHAFEA, is engaged in an entirely 
different type of work than the others: it promotes, assists, and communicates existing 
programs, standards, and collaborative networks across Europe, which means, 
ďasiĐallǇ, that this ageŶĐǇ is ͚oŶ the fƌoŶtliŶe ǁith stakeholdeƌs [outside the EuƌopeaŶ 
iŶstitutioŶs, TK] eǀeƌǇ daǇ͛. 
Of the other five executive agencies, they describe their work primarily as funding 
projects. Specifically, they fuŶd ͚disƌuptiǀe aŶd iŶŶoǀatiǀe pƌojeĐts aĐƌoss Euƌope iŶ the 
aƌeas of eŶeƌgǇ effiĐieŶĐǇ, Đliŵate ŵitigatioŶ aŶd ƌesouƌĐe effiĐieŶĐǇ͛ ;EA“MEͿ; 
respectivelǇ ͚ŵaŶage paƌts of the EU͛s fuŶdiŶg pƌogƌaŵŵes iŶ the aƌeas of eduĐatioŶ, 
tƌaiŶiŶg, Ǉouth aŶd spoƌt, audioǀisual aŶd Đultuƌe, ĐitizeŶship aŶd huŵaŶitaƌiaŶ aid͛ 
;EACEAͿ; ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ suppoƌt ͚ƌeseaƌĐh … iŶ the aƌeas of ͞“ŵaƌt, gƌeeŶ aŶd iŶtegƌated 
transport͟ aŶd ͞“eĐuƌe, ĐleaŶ aŶd effiĐieŶt eŶeƌgǇ͛͟ as ǁell as iŵpleŵeŶt 
͚iŶfƌastƌuĐtuƌe pƌojeĐts aĐƌoss the EU͛ ;INEAͿ; ƌespeĐtiǀelǇ fuŶd pƌojeĐts that ͚haǀe 
produced ground-breaking results, generating new discoveries, boosting European 
innovation and improving people͛s liǀes͛ ;E‘CEAͿ. 
0 
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CHAFEA EACEA EASME ERCEA INEA REA 
1.1: Competitiveness 2: Natural resources
3: Security and Citizenship 4: Global Europe
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Table 4: Analysis of self-described types of work and results 
targeted 
 Description of work Result 
CHAFEA Promote / assist / communicate Awareness / cooperation, networks / trainings 
EACEA Fund, manage Projects 
EASME Fund, manage Projects 
ERCEA Fund, manage Projects 
INEA Fund, implement, manage Projects 
REA Fund, manage / provide Projects / services 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ analysis of a recently published pamphlet (Commission En Direct 2016). 
These agencies are in the business of distributing public funds for a given period of 
time to enable the conduct a set of dedicated works with the expectation that, in the 
end, the result will contribute to an overarching policy goal. It is a very labor-intensive 
type of work, not least because it requires taking into account many European 
regulations (financial, non-discriminatory, and the like), and also certain secondary 
actions, including promotion of results that the projects have achieved. In addition to 
all that, one agency (REA) explicitly mentions yet another type of work in addition to 
ŵaŶagiŶg the distƌiďutioŶ of fuŶds, ŶaŵelǇ ͚suppoƌt seƌǀiĐes foƌ the ǁhole of HϮϬϮϬ 
[the EU ƌeseaƌĐh fuŶdiŶg pƌogƌaŵ, TK]͛ iŶ the foƌŵ of ͚eǆpeƌt eǀaluatoƌ ĐoŶtƌaĐtiŶg, 
evaluation facility management, project participant validation and the management of 
the Research Enquiry Service, which handles questions on EU-funded research, calls for 
pƌoposals, pƌojeĐt pƌoposals aŶd pƌojeĐts͛. 
In her analysis of decentralized agencies, Madalina Busuioc (2013, 38) distinguishes 
ďetǁeeŶ ͚information providing, management, operational cooperation, decision-
making, and quasi-ƌegulatoƌǇ ageŶĐies͛. AĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ, CHAFEA would primarily be 
located in the category of ͚iŶfoƌŵatioŶ pƌoǀidiŶg͛. The otheƌ fiǀe ageŶĐies can be firmly 
loĐated iŶ the ĐategoƌiĐal spaĐe of ͚ŵaŶagiŶg͛, aŶd paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ so if dealiŶg ǁith laƌge 
budget appropriations, as is the case with EASME, INEA, ERCEA, and REA. The typology, 
however, requires additional refinement, along a more detailed analysis of the 
respective organizational framework of the programs that have been (partly) assigned 
to the executive agencies. While the operative budget details provide only some 
indication, it is clear that some agencies are tasked to carry out one (or several) specific 
(sub-)program(s) entirely on their own, such as ERCEA or INEA, while others provide 
outsourcing of several different parts of one or several such programs (REA; EASME); 
some others again have assembled activities from various areas (EACEA; CHAFEA). 
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4 Organizational setup 
How are the six executive agencies organized in order to successfully carrying out the 
specific tasks assigned to them? And what is their relationship to the parental 
organization, the European Commission? Again, Regulation 58 is key as it also provides 
the basic concept for the internal governance of executive agencies. It prescribes that 
aŶ eǆeĐutiǀe ageŶĐǇ ͚shall ďe ŵaŶaged ďǇ a “teering Committee and a director͛, with 
the latteƌ͛s teƌŵ liŵited to foƌ douƌ Ǉeaƌs (Council of the European Union 2002, L 
57/1:art.7(1)) Both the members of the Steering Committee and the director are 
appointed by the European Commission, and, usually, they are all chosen from the 
higher ranks of Commission functionaries – for the director, it is even foreseen that ͚aŶ 
offiĐial ǁithiŶ the ŵeaŶiŶg of the “taff ‘egulatioŶs͛ of the Commission has to be 
chosen. (Council of the European Union 2002, L 57/1:art.10(1)). In addition, issues 
concerning staffing, equipment, auditing, budget, and reporting duties are dealt with 
the Commission directly, too. 
Formally at least this setup assures that each executive agency is operated along the 
same line. This allows for an analysis of the de jure autonomy that the six existing 
executive agencies enjoy. To do so, four analytical components can be distinguished, 
according to agencification literature (Wonka and Rittberger 2010). The four 
components are the formal mandate of the agency; the rules for appointing the agency 
head; rules for appointing the members of aŶ ageŶĐǇ͛s ŵaŶageŵeŶt ďoaƌd; and the 
ƌegulatioŶs oŶ aŶ ageŶĐǇ͛s ;iŶteƌŶalͿ deĐisioŶ-making. Each component can be formally 
analyzed along several variables, and the variables can be referred to a certain value 
ďetǁeeŶ Ϭ aŶd ϭ. TakeŶ togetheƌ, the ǀaƌiaďles ƌesult iŶ a ͚iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe sĐoƌe͛ of 0.47 
for each of the six executive agencies (see Annex 3 for the full list of variables). 
While this score has little significance in itself, as it tells little aďout the ageŶĐies͛ 
͚aĐtual autoŶoŵǇ oƌ daǇ-to-day policy-ŵakiŶg pƌaĐtiĐes͛ (Rittberger and Wonka 2011, 
783), two things become apparent. Even if executive agencies were actively seeking to 
achieve more autonomy, there is little room for interpretation left, since the four 
analytical components that constitute the core governance structure, are already 
defined in Regulation 58. And, those legal provisions in the legal text explicitly foresee 
that the influence of the European Commission remains high. Still, the agencification 
literature distinguishes between de jure and de facto autonomy, and for good reasons. 
Given the findings in the previous two sections, the extent of de facto autonomy might 
still vary from one executive agency to another. 
To that end, three levels of autonomy can be distinguished. Operative autonomy 
means that agencies have a certain degree of independence for conducting their 
programs. Organizational autonomy means that agencies are independent, to a certain 
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degree, to determine their own internal structure. And ideational autonomy means 
that staff members identify with their agency (as a distinct entity from the 
Commission) and that it is publicly recognized as a separate body. Yet it has to be 
pointed out that there is hardly any evidence about the relationship between executive 
agencies and their parental DG(s), with the exception of formalized reporting exercises 
and glossy self-description. Since this paper does not draw on first-hand evidence from 
within the agencies for qualitative analysis (such as interviews and ethnographic 
studies), it can only discuss potential indicators for building preliminary hypotheses, 
based on the collected data in table 5.  
A first important difference between the executive agencies that may have an impact 
on their de facto autoŶoŵǇ has to do ǁith aŶ ageŶĐǇ͛s degƌee of oǁŶeƌship of a 
program. Thus, one hypothesis could be that agencies like INEA and ERCEA have a 
higher degree of operative autonomy than other executive agencies, because they 
seem to own a large share of a (sub-)program. On the other hand, it may as well be 
that the fixation on one program (again, imperfectly expressed in the number of 
ďudget Đhapteƌs iŶ taďle ϱͿ ŵaǇ liŵit ageŶĐies͛ aďilitǇ to aĐhieǀe a higheƌ degƌee of 
indispensableness to the Commission. Again, it should be noted that it is difficult to 
determine this share simply from the comparison of budget chapters with statements 
in the annual activity reports of the agencies, due to the fact that programs are only 
incompletely represented in the share of a budget chapter.  
Table 5: Potential indicators for de facto autonomy 
 
No of budget 
chapters 
% owning 
budget chapters 
Parental DGs 
Name 
changes 
CHAFEA 4 24,84 3 2 
EACEA 9 37,19 4 0 
EASME 9 22,58 7 2 
ERCEA 1 33,51 1 0 
INEA 6 52,91 4 1 
REA 8 33,97 6 0 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv. 
Another obvious difference between executive agencies is the number of parental 
Directorate Generals (DGs) that they have to report to. The question is open whether a 
larger number is beneficial to the organizational autonomy of an executive agency, 
since it may allow the agency to play with different principals, or whether this is rather 
detrimental – for example, it could be that the ageŶĐǇ͛s internal organization is forced 
to enforce multiple ownership in its organizational structure. A last difference concerns 
the ideational autonomy of an executive agency, in other words: to what extent is an 
agency able to develop, and pertain, its own identity. Obviously, a crucial aspect of this 
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is the name of the organization, so the fact that some agencies have changed their 
name once or twice may indicate that they have less ability to develop this kind of 
autonomy. 
The three different layers of autonomy – operational, organizational, and ideational – 
cannot solely be determined simply by the data in table 5, but have to be examined 
through other sources; also, the strict confinement of the legal provisions of Regulation 
58 will have to be taken into consideration. Still, there is the example of the ERCEA, 
which is often seen as an outlier to the rest of the executive agencies, since it is the 
only one that consists of an additional layer of decision-making and has, de facto, a 
more complicated governance structure (European Commission 2007, L 57/14:art.4, 
5(1), and art.10, (4) and art. 5(1)). The existence of this particular agency, however, 
could also be read as evidence that, whatever the legal provisions, there may be 
nuances in the degree of autonomy of the six executive agencies worth discovering. 
5 Outlook 
Ultimately, executive agencies can be characterized as work horses tasked to carry out 
labor-intensive programs. They are cheap, since staff is mostly employed along wage 
levels below that of Commission functionaries. They are easy to oversee, since they 
follow a simple and mainstreamed governance structure, with the Commission in tight 
command. And since their mandates are tightly knit to multiannual financial 
frameworks, they can be reprogrammed without too much effort. Even dissolving one 
of them would, theoretically, not be too difficult. So what does this make in 
comparison to the decentralized agencies?xii 
When it comes to the historical context of their respective emergence and their 
functionality, decentralized agencies have been incepted at European level since the 
mid 1970s, and since the early 1990s, there number has been growing rapidly 
(Kelemen 2005, 180–86; Pollak and Riekmann 2008, 775–76; Wonka and Rittberger 
2010, 731–32). Contrary to that, legal provision for setting up executive agencies has 
only been established in 2002, and all existing agencies have been set up during a short 
period of time, between 2004 and 2007. 
Decentralized agencies have a common denominator, namely that they are outside the 
institutional framework of the European Commission, and that only the Parliament and 
the Council decide about their creation. Typically, this is done in a separate legal text 
per body; given the influence of member states in setting them up, it is hardly 
surprising that they are distributed across the entire EU. All that does not necessarily 
ŵeaŶ that theǇ aƌe out of the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s politiĐal gƌip, Ŷoƌ that the CoŵŵissioŶ 
does not exert administrative power over them.xiii Still, in comparison, executive 
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agencies are under the wings of the Commission; their basic legal provision is the same 
for all six of them; and they are all in close proximity to the EU power center, that is, 
five of them are located in Brussels and one in Luxembourg. 
Given that there are nowadays more than 30 decentralized agencies in the EU, it would 
be difficult to come up with one common functionality of all of them. But, on a very 
common level, theǇ ĐaŶ ďe Đalled ͚tools of ƌegulatioŶ aŶd adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛, ǁith ͚theiƌ 
primary functioŶ͛ ďeiŶg ͚to suppoƌt the poliĐǇ-making process through the provision of 
iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ (Pollak and Riekmann 2008, 777). The function of the six executive 
agencies is threefold, at least when it comes to the European Commission. They help 
reducing administrative costs by using cheaper workforce (primarily contract staff) for 
program that require particularly intensive use of human resources. Second, they are 
also flexible organizational tools, being easily re-focused and re-programmed. Third, 
outsourcing allows the DGs to focus on their immediate tasks, that is, policy 
formulation and monitoring of implementation. 
When it comes to comparing the fields of action, it seems to be fair to summarize their 
ǀaƌious aŶd diffeƌiŶg tasks as ͚help[iŶ] iŶ iŵpleŵeŶtiŶg CoŵŵuŶitǇ ƌegulatioŶ͛, 
whereas executive agencies are tasked to operate specific programs that the 
Commission is delegating to them (European Court of Auditors 2009, 31, which also 
provides a more general comparison between the two types of agencies). Specifically, 
most executive agencies are primarily engaged in distributing funds in programs under 
the heading of competitiveness, which is set up to ͚the pƌoŵotioŶ of ƌeseaƌĐh, 
innovation and technological development; specific action in favour of the 
competitiveness of enterprises and SMEs; investing in education and in human skills 
[…]; aŶd deǀelopiŶg the soĐial ageŶda͛ (European Council 2013, 7). 
“iŶĐe theǇ aƌe plaǇiŶg aŶ iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole iŶ eǆeĐutiŶg aŶ eŵeƌgiŶg ͚Euƌope 
of KŶoǁledge͛ (Chou and Gornitzka 2014; similarly, Beerkens 2008) that is becoming an 
important branch of European integration, executive agencies are distributing large 
amounts of money; the issue of their autonomy and, consequently, of their 
accountability should also be of general interest. A comparison with decentralized 
ageŶĐies is diffiĐult, as the latteƌs͛ organizational set-up and the independence, or 
autonomy, is differing, due to the fact that each of the agencies is established with a 
separate legal act (regulation). For executive agencies, there is only one, binding, legal 
provision. In comparison to the results of the descriptive analysis of de jure autonomy, 
as assessed by Wonka and Rittberger (2010, 731–32), executive agencies, with a 
projected score of 0.47 (as mentioned in the previous chapter) have more formal-
iŶstitutioŶal iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe thaŶ ϭϱ of the deĐeŶtƌalized ageŶĐies͛ ;ǁhose sĐoƌe lies 
between 0.21 and 0.46) and are less independent than 14 others (whose score lies 
between 0.49 and 0.64).xiv 
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This Working Paper has produced some insight into the hitherto unknown world of 
European executive agencies, attempting to emphasize the significance of the 
organizational change they represent. It should not end without raising more detailed 
questions for upcoming research. One important issue would be to move on from the 
CoŵŵissioŶ͛s offiĐial peƌspeĐtiǀe oŶ the fuŶĐtioŶiŶg of eǆeĐutiǀe ageŶĐies. It ƌeŵaiŶs 
an open question whether executive agencies are merely recipients of orders by the 
parental DGs, or whether they manage to gain independence (via informal expertise, or 
via collective identity building among their employees), and if so, to which degree this 
is the case. The same goes for the questions of accountability (what do the tight and 
formalistic procedures of guiding, auditing and supervising the financial behavior of 
executive agencies sufficient achieve?) and reliability (does the overriding paradigm of 
cost-saǀiŶg uŶdeƌŵiŶe the effiĐieŶĐǇ of eǆeĐutiǀe ageŶĐies͛ eŵploǇees who are mostly 
temporarily appointed and, in comparison Commission functionaries, poorly paid?) 
(Suvarierol, Busuioc, and Groenleer 2013). All these questions require qualitative 
analysis, such as interviews, ethnographic observation, etc. 
Another set of questions concerns the place of the executive agencies in the larger 
diversifying European administrative space (Balint, Bauer, and Knill 2008, 678). What 
role, if any, do executive agencies play in relation to national administrative agencies 
and ministries, and how do they relate to the other European institutions? Are there 
attempts to use Parliament and Council to gain significance within the Commission? 
Here, a more detailed and nuanced perspective on single agencies would probably be 
useful. Do any of the other agencies follow the path of the ERCEA in gaining public 
visibility and also exerting organizational impact on policy fields in member states? 
Executive agencies could also be a mode to analyze more coherently policy fields, such 
as the Europe of Knowledge. For while they cannot clearly be assigned to this broad 
field, and even if they are not the most important tool of distribution of funds (yet), 
executive agencies today play a crucial role in executing the growing number of 
programs in areas such as secondary education, higher education, academic exchange 
and research funding. 
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Annex 
Annex 1: Table of delegated budget chapters, 2012 
EA Chapter Name Budget (Mio) % of total FF Heading 
EA
H
C
 
[C
H
A
FE
A
] 
17 04 
Food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and Plant 
health 
ϭϰ,ϭϮ € 4,22 2: Natural resources 
17 02 Consumer policy ϭϱ,ϴϵ € 75,34 3: Security and Citizenship 
17 03 Public health ϯϰ,ϴϮ € 16,25 3: Security and Citizenship 
20 02 Trade policy Ϭ,ϱϬ € 4,49 4: Global Europe 
21 02 Food security ϴ,ϬϬ € 3,25 4: Global Europe 
EA
C
EA
 
15 02 Lifelong learning, including multilingualism Ϯϰϳ,ϴϰ € 18,43 1.1: Competitiveness 
15 04 Developing cultural and audiovisual cooperation in Europe ϭϳϴ,ϴϮ € 102,31 3: Security and Citizenship 
15 05 
Encouraging and promoting cooperation in the field of youth and 
sports 
Ϯϳ,ϭϵ € 18,74 3: Security and Citizenship 
16 05 Fostering European citizenship 27,40 € 85,12 3: Security and Citizenship 
19 05 Relations and cooperation with industrialised third countries ϵ,ϮϮ € 38,38 4: Global Europe 
19 08 European Neighbourhood Policy and relations with Russia ϭϯϱ,ϱϭ € 5,73 4: Global Europe 
19 09 Relations with Latin America Ϭ,ϴϬ € 0,22 4: Global Europe 
19 10 
Relations with Asia, Central Asia and Middle East (Iraq, Iran, 
Yemen 
ϯ,Ϯϱ € 0,36 4: Global Europe 
21 06 
Geographical cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) States 
Ϭ,ϬϬ € 0,00 4: Global Europe 
22 02 Enlargement process and strategy Ϯϯ,ϯϮ € 2,34 4: Global Europe 
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EA
C
I 
[E
A
SM
E]
 02 02 
Competitiveness, industrial policy, innovation and 
entrepreneurship 
ϵϮ,ϱϮ € 45,47 1.1: Competitiveness 
06 02 Inland, air and maritime transport ϴϬ,ϲϰ € 38,50 1.1: Competitiveness 
32 04 Conventional and renewable energies ϴϮ,ϲϳ € 57,23 1.1: Competitiveness 
ER
C
EA
 08 10 Ideas ϭ.ϲϭϬ,ϭϳ € 102,89 1.1: Competitiveness 
08 22 
Completion of previous framework programmes and other 
activities 
ϰϵ,ϵϱ € 43,87 1.1: Competitiveness 
TE
N
-T
 E
A
 
[I
N
EA
] 
06 03 Trans-European Networks ϭ.ϯϭϳ,ϱϲ € 99,41 1.1: Competitiveness 
R
EA
 
02 04 Cooperation: Space and Security Ϯϲϴ,Ϭϰ € 44,71 1.1: Competitiveness 
08 13 
Capacities: Research for the benefit of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) 
ϭϵϳ,Ϯϲ € 78,53 1.1: Competitiveness 
08 22 
Completion of previous framework programmes and other 
activities 
ϮϮ,Ϭϵ € 19,40 1.1: Competitiveness 
15 07 People: Programme for the mobility of researchers ϴϱϴ,ϳϮ € 94,71 1.1: Competitiveness 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv. 
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Annex 2: Table of delegated budget chapters, 2016 
EA Chapter Name 
Budget 
(Mio) 
% of total FF Heading 
C
H
A
FE
A
 
05 02 
Improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector through 
interventions in agricultural markets 
ϭϴ,ϰϴ € 0,68 2: Natural resources 
17 03 Public health ϱϬ,ϬϬ € 23,27 3: Security and Citizenship 
17 04 
Food and feed safety, animal health, animal welfare and Plant 
health 
ϭϱ,ϯϳ € 6,05 3: Security and Citizenship 
33 04 Consumer programme ϭϲ,Ϯϱ € 69,36 3: Security and Citizenship 
EA
C
EA
 
15 02 Erasmus + ϯϮϯ,ϰϴ € 19,01 1.1 Competitiveness 
09 05 Creative Europe ϭϬϲ,ϱϲ € 82,51 3: Security and Citizenship 
15 04 Creative Europe ϱϴ,ϯϲ € 75,29 3: Security and Citizenship 
18 04 Fostering European citizenship ϮϮ,ϳϵ € 99,17 3: Security and Citizenship 
19 05 
Cooperation with third countries under the Partnership Instrument 
(PI) 
ϱ,ϴϭ € 4,83 4: Global Europe 
21 02 Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) 98,52 € 3,86 4: Global Europe 
22 02 Enlargement process and strategy ϭϰ,ϳϮ € 1,00 4: Global Europe 
22 04 European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) ϱϰ,ϯϲ € 2,47 4: Global Europe 
23 04 EU Aid Volunteers initiative ϳ,ϴϳ € 46,60 4: Global Europe 
EA
SM
E 
05 09 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to agriculture ϭϵ,ϲϳ € 9,18 1.1 Competitiveness 
06 03 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to transport ϮϬ,ϭϵ € 9,32 1.1 Competitiveness 
08 02 Horizon 2020 - Research ϱϬϱ,ϰϵ € 9,47 1.1 Competitiveness 
09 04 Horizon 2020 [ICT] ϭϭϭ,ϭϮ € 7,96 1.1 Competitiveness 
18 05 Horizon 2020 - Research related to security ϭϮ,ϯϭ € 9,05 1.1 Competitiveness 
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32 04 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to energy ϭϯϰ,ϲϴ € 41,48 1.1 Competitiveness 
07 02 Environmental policy at Union and international level ϮϬϮ,ϵϰ € 52,44 2: Natural resources 
11 06 European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) ϯϱ,ϴϴ € 3,98 2: Natural resources 
34 02 Climate action at Union and international level ϲϳ,ϵϳ € 60,36 2: Natural resources 
ER
C
EA
 
08 02 Horizon 2020 - Research ϭ.ϳϴϴ,ϭϲ € 33,51 1.1 Competitiveness 
IN
EA
 
06 02 European transport policy ϯ.ϳϳϴ,ϴϰ € 96,11 1.1 Competitiveness 
06 03 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to transport ϳϲ,ϭϱ € 35,17 1.1 Competitiveness 
08 02 Horizon 2020 - Research ϱϮϴ,ϲϵ € 9,91 1.1 Competitiveness 
09 03 Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) - Telecommunication networks ϳϬ,ϱϭ € 50,21 1.1 Competitiveness 
32 02 Conventional and renewable energies ϰϵϱ,ϭϯ € 77,22 1.1 Competitiveness 
32 04 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to energy ϭϱϴ,ϱϲ € 48,84 1.1 Competitiveness 
R
EA
 
02 04 Horizon 2020 - Research relating to enterprises ϭϬϯ,Ϭϭ € 38,00 1.1 Competitiveness 
05 09 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to agriculture ϭϵϭ,ϭϴ € 89,25 1.1 Competitiveness 
06 03 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to transport Ϭ,ϯϳ € 0,17 1.1 Competitiveness 
08 02 Horizon 2020 - Research ϯϰϴ,ϲϵ € 6,53 1.1 Competitiveness 
09 04 Horizon 2020 [ICT] ϭϰϯ,ϳϭ € 10,29 1.1 Competitiveness 
15 03 Horizon 2020 [Education and Culture] ϴϰϱ,ϵϮ € 85,12 1.1 Competitiveness 
18 05 Horizon 2020 - Research related to security ϱϳ,ϳϯ € 42,42 1.1 Competitiveness 
32 04 Horizon 2020 - Research and innovation related to energy Ϭ,ϬϮ € 0,01 1.1 Competitiveness 
Author͛s oǁŶ ĐoŵpilatioŶ, ďased oŶ data as mentioned in endnote iv. 
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Annex 3: Formal-Institutional Independence Score of 
executive agencies 
Variable Scores Remarks  
A1: Formal mandate of agency  
V1 Competence EU Agency 0.50  
A2: Appointment 1: Agency Head (AH) Director, as def. in Reg. 58, art.10-11 of  
V2 Term of agency head (AH) 0.40 
Due to missing scoring 
methodology, the score could be 
0.40 or 0.60. 
V3 Selectorate/appointees of AH 0.00  
V4 Quorum appointment AH 1.00 
Director is appointed by 
Commission 
V5 Rules for AH dismissal 0.00  
V6 Other offices AH 1.00  
V7 Reappointment of AH 0.00  
V8 (Formal) AH independence 0.00  
V9 Formal requirement for AH Qualification 1.00  
A3: Appointment 2: Members of the 
Management Board (MMB) 
MMB = Steering Committee, as def. in Reg. 58, 
art.8 
V10 Term of office MMB 0.20 See comment on V2 
V11 Selectorate/appointees of MMB 0.00  
V12 Rules for MMB dismissal 0.33  
V13 Other offices MMB 0.00  
V14 Reappointment of MMB 0.00  
V15 (Formal) MMB independence 0.50  
V16 Formal requirement MMB Qualification 1.00  
Aϰ: ‘egulatioŶs oŶ ageŶĐies͛ ;iŶteƌŶalͿ 
decision-making 
Agency=executive agency 
V17 Formal independence of agency 1.00  
Vϭϴ AgeŶĐǇ͛s foƌŵal ƌepoƌtiŶg oďligatioŶs – 
annual reports (retrospective) 
0.00  
Vϭϵ AgeŶĐǇ͛s foƌŵal ƌepoƌtiŶg oďligatioŶs – 
annual working programme (prospective) 
0.00  
VϮϬ ͚EǆĐlusiǀeŶess͛ of ageŶĐǇ͛s ĐoŵpeteŶĐies 
in its field of responsibility 
1.00  
V21 Agency discretion to decide on activities 0.00  
VϮϮ AgeŶĐǇ͛s eǆteƌŶal ĐoŶsultatioŶ pƌaĐtiĐe 1.00  
V23 Agency appeals board 1.00  
V24 Competent bodies to appeal agency 
decisions 
0.80  
VϮϱ CoŵpeteŶĐe to desigŶ ageŶĐǇ͛s iŶteƌŶal 
organization 
1.00  
VϮϲ ‘eĐƌuitŵeŶt of ageŶĐǇ͛s peƌŵaŶeŶt staff? 1.00  
V27 Resource dependency of agency 0.33  
Result 0.47  
This scoreboard follows Wonka and Rittberger (2010, 750–52), based on their interpretation of Gilardi (2002, 2008). 
Note that some scoreboard variables are at points unclear (V2 and V10), and that it is difficult to translate the 
meaning of some others to the specific circumstances of the executive agencies (V22 and V23). 
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i Parts of this account are drawn from my book on the ERC (König 2017), and I have published an article with some of 
the data on executive agencies from 2012/13 (König 2015). An earlier version has been presented at the ECPR Annual 
Conference in Bordeaux 2013. I am grateful to Tim Flink, Meng-Hsuan Chou, Inga Ulnicane-Ozolina, and Svend-Erik 
Skaaning, as well as an anonymous reviewer, for comments.  
ii Foƌ a ďƌief defiŶitioŶ of the teƌŵ ͚fuŶĐtioŶal deĐeŶtƌalizatioŶ͛, see BöĐkeŶföƌde (2011). I am grateful to the 
anonymous reviewer for the suggestion. 
iii A critical reader may object that claim by pointing to academic literature on one executive agency, the ERCEA (cf. 
Hofmann 2012; Winnacker 2012; Gornitzka and Metz 2014; Flink 2015; König 2017). It is important to note that 
literature has been concerned with the European Research Council (ERC) more generally, a funding instrument for 
academic research; the ERCEA has been created to manage this instrument, but it is not the only entity in the ERC 
compound (there is also an independent expert group, the Scientific Council). Certainly, nowhere in the literature has 
there been an attempt to analyze executive agencies as a distinct type of administrative bodies, maybe with the 
exception of some cursory remarks in an older paper of the author (König 2015). 
iv Specifically, and unless no other source is mentioned, the data for the tables in sections 2-4 and in Annexes 1 and 2 
has been taken from the adopted EU budget of the years 2012 and 2016 (European Parliament 2012, L 56/1:II/80-
1142, 2016, L 48/1:398–1662), and the Annex 3 of the Annual Activity Report of the executive agencies of the same 
Ǉeaƌs, ;͞Dƌaft aŶŶual aĐĐouŶts aŶd fiŶaŶĐial ƌepoƌts͟, taďle ϭ: CoŵŵitŵeŶts, ĐoluŵŶ ͚CoŵŵitŵeŶt appƌopƌiatioŶs 
authoƌized͛Ϳ (EAHC 2013; CHAFEA 2017; EACEA 2013, 2017; EACI 2013; EASME 2017; TEN-T EA 2013; INEA 2017; 
ERCEA 2013, 2017, REA 2013, 2017) 
v Those teĐhŶiĐal assistaŶĐe offiĐes ǁeƌe pƌiǀatelǇ ƌuŶ aŶd, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to a Couƌt of Auditoƌ ƌepoƌt fƌoŵ ϮϬϬϵ, ͚ǁeƌe 
criticised in particular for the vague definition of the tasks, the poor control exercised by the Commission over their 
activities, the threat to budget transparency due to the use of operational appropriations to fund administrative costs 
borne by the TAO s, and non-compliance with the relevant accouŶtaďilitǇ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts.͛ (European Court of Auditors 
2009, 8) 
vi That did not stop David Cameron, then Prime Minister of the UŶited KiŶgdoŵ, to iŶsist puďliĐlǇ that ͚theǇ [the 
EuƌopeaŶ CoŵŵissioŶ, TK] aƌe […] Ŷot pƌoposiŶg to ŵake aŶǇ Đuts to the ĐeŶtƌal adŵiŶistƌatiǀe Đosts͛ (cf. The 
Telegraph 2012). At this point in time, the Commission had already announced to reduce salaries and extend 
workweeks (European Commission 2011b; European Parliament, Council of the European Union, and European 
Commission 2013, C 373/1:5) – the second cut within less than ten years. 
vii As is quite common for organizing public budgets, the budget is divided into more than 30 titles (two-digit 
numbers, starting from 01) correlating to policy fields and somewhat identical with the Commission Directorate 
Generals. Each of the titles includes a number of (four-digit) chapters, and each chapter contains (six-digit) articles, 
which are specified into (eight-digit) items. Each item constitutes a budget line, and each budget contains a figure, 
the actual budget of that line. 
viii Foƌ eǆaŵple, the MFF headiŶg ͞ϭa – CoŵpetitiǀeŶess foƌ gƌoǁth aŶd joďs͟ ĐoŶsists of pƌogƌaŵs suĐh as the 
Fƌaŵeǁoƌk Pƌogƌaŵŵe foƌ ‘eseaƌĐh ;͞HoƌizoŶ ϮϬϮϬ͟Ϳ, the EuƌopeaŶ Eaƌth OďseƌǀatioŶ Pƌogƌaŵŵe ;͞CopeƌŶiĐus͟Ϳ, 
the European Fund for Strategic Investments, etc. And again, for each program there is a figure, which represents the 
budget committed to carry out this pƌogƌaŵ. The otheƌ headiŶgs ĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ aƌe: ͞ϭď - Economic, social and territorial 
CohesioŶ͟, ͞Ϯ - “ustaiŶaďle gƌoǁth: Natuƌal ƌesouƌĐes͟, ͞ϯ - “eĐuƌitǇ aŶd CitizeŶship͟, ͞ϰ - Gloďal Euƌope͟, aŶd ͞ϱ – 
AdŵiŶistƌatioŶ͟. Note that the ŶaŵiŶg of the headiŶgs is slightly changing over time, but their number as well as 
their order has been stable for the last two cycles of financial frameworks. 
ix As a side note, it seems as if the relevance of the policy areas related to the budget titles has somewhat decreased 
with the recent Financial Framework 2014-ϮϬWhile the WoƌkiŶg DoĐuŵeŶt I aĐĐoŵpaŶǇiŶg the CoŵŵissioŶ͛s aŶŶual 
budget draft has been organized around the policy areas up until the end of the period of the previous MFF 
(European Commission 2012a), the same type of document is now organized around the MFF headings (cf. European 
Commission 2015) 
x Specifically, it is not oŶlǇ iŶ the ďudget title Ϭϴ ;͞‘eseaƌĐh͟Ϳ, ǁheƌe it is to ďe ŶatuƌallǇ eǆpeĐted, ďut also iŶ ϬϮ 
;͞IŶteƌŶal ŵaƌket, iŶdustƌǇ, eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌship aŶd “MEs͟Ϳ, Ϭϱ ;͞AgƌiĐultuƌe aŶd ƌuƌal deǀelopŵeŶt͟Ϳ, Ϭϲ ;͞MoďilitǇ 
aŶd tƌaŶspoƌt͟Ϳ, Ϭϵ ;͞CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ Ŷetǁoƌks, ĐoŶteŶt aŶd teĐhŶologǇ͟Ϳ, aŶd so oŶ. 
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xi The titles of the MFF headings have been consolidated on the 2016 version, since there are only little differences in 
names. Note that within several budget chapters, specific items have been assigned to different MFF headings 
(specifically, in the 2012 budget, this concerns chapters 15 04, 17 02, 17 03, 17 04, 19 08, 22 02; in the 2016 budget, 
this concerns chapters 06 02, 07 02, 08 02, 17 03, 17 04, 22 04, 32 02, 33 04, 34 02). In all those cases, a clear 
majority of budget items within a chapter belonging to a certain MFF heading, also marking the highest absolute 
share of the entire budget of this chapter, could be identified, which is why all those budget chapters were assigned 
to one respective MFF heading. 
xii For a useful comparison from within the EU bureaucratic apparatus, see also the table provided in the Draft 
General Budget 2013 of the Commission (European Commission 2012b, 21) 
xiii For the latter, a Commission Communication on decentralized agencies makes for an interesting reading 
(European Commission 2013b). 
xiv Foƌ ĐoŵpaƌisoŶ: The highest foƌŵal iŶdepeŶdeŶĐe sĐoƌe of ͚iŶdepeŶdeŶt ƌegulatoƌǇ ageŶĐies͛ at ŶatioŶal leǀel 
have the score 0.75 (according to Gilardi 2002, 879). 
